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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
McKAY DEE HOSPITAL,
Plaintiff,
Case No.

-vs-

16182

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and TED CLARK SPACKMAN,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendants

ag~ee

with statement of Plaintiff on •oisposition

of the Case before the Industrial Commission.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek an affirmance of the Order of the Industrial
Commission.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Statement of Facts in the Brief of the Plaintiff McKay
Dee Hospital is incorrect in the following:
1.

The defendant hit a low ceiling with his cast one month

after the original cast was applied and not •about two weeks.•
2.

The pin came out at time of removing the cast and not

because of hitting cast on ceiling.
3.
origin<Jl

Infection in the bone developed during the time
c:<~e>t

was on and not after the ceiling incident.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT I.
EMPLOYEE'S INJURY WAS NOT PURPOSELY
SELF-INFLICTED.
Section 35-1-45 reads:

Every employee mentioned in section 35-1-43
who is injured, and the dependents of every such
employee who is killed, by accident arising out
of or in the course of his employment, wheresoevery such injury occurred, provided the same was
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be entitled
to receive, and shall be paid, such compensation
for loss sustained on account of such injury or
death, and such amount for medical, nurse and
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of
death, such amount of funeral expenses, as is
herein provined. (emphasis added) •
The statute is clear on its face that compensation shall be
paid unless the injury was purposely self-inflicted.

Spackman

did things that n.any would consider foolish, childish or negligent.
But this type of behavior does not cause denial under the workmen's
compensation law of Utah.

The statute prohibits compensation only

when the employ<'" purposely self-inflicts injury upon himself. . .
such as in a suicin.

or setting fire to one's gas soiled clothing.

The employc·e went to the office of his supervisor during
"break"

(R-25)

to inquire about his work schedule.

felt they were ri.illl
in disagreement
anger.

over~

Both purties

in their opinions (R-1) but words were

spoke.~

the work schedule and the employee left in

He hit some boxPs and garbage cans (R-27) on his way out

and then hit a

na·1 <~l

door with his fists.

The knuckle of his
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1

little finger on his right hand hit the edge or lip of
locked door.

(R-28 and 29) and a bone in the little

~

fiDge~

...

broken.
To deny compensation the statute madates that the
"purposely self-inflected."

The act of the employee ia

iAjazy ._
lai~t:!Dw

the door with his fist was an intentional and purpoaefal eot.

aat

it certainly does not follow in anyway from the facta of thi8

aa.e

that the employee purposely or otherwise intended to injure
self.

b~

The act was intended but not the injury.
The definition of "purposely" is that the act be •with a

deliberate or expressed purpose, intentionally.

Webster'• SaYaAth

New Collegiate Dictionary.
The act may have been negligent.

• .but negligeace doee aot

destroy the right to compensation under the law of worka8n'a
pensation.

Twin Peaks Co. v. Ind. Com.

~

57 Ut. 589.

There is a vast difference between the purposful self-infliction of an injury such as in a suicide or in deliberately aetting oneself on fire when clothing is saturated with gasoline
Carland v. Vance, 137 Pa. Super 47, 10 A.2d 114 (1939) and in being
injured doincJ a foolish or negligent act, Buhler v. Maddison, 109
Utah 245, or even a prohibited act or injury caused in play or
pranks.

Twin Peaks Co. v. Ind. Com.

We agree that our Utah statute 35-1-45 supra provides for
a defense where the injury is purposely self-inflicted, but that
is not the

I del ui!l

distingui~:hablc

-qG tH::2 61 r, _

In

': i

luation in this case.

'l'his case is certainly

fro"' Henry v. Schenk Mechanical Contractors, Inc.
t h-1r

case the "board" found that the employee
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intentionally inflicted injury upon himself.

In the present

case the Commission found that applicant's injury was not theresult of a self inflicted injury.
Utah cases are in complete conformity in holding that where
the employee is within the cause of his employment it is immaterial
whether he was guilty of negligence or wilful misconduct.
v. Ind. Com.

112 Ut. 488, 189 P.2 132.

M&K CotE_.

Larson's Workmen's

Compensation Section 30.00 and 30.10 on Misconduct of Employee
states:

S30.

GENEHJ\L IRRELEVANCE OF EMPLOYEE FAULT

§30.00 Misconduct of the employee, whether
negligent or wi 1 ful, i~ i;·,material in compensation law, unless it tak<·s the form of deviation
from the course of employment, or unless i t is
of a kind specific.,Jly Jlade a defense in the
jurisdictions cont.1 initH; such a defense in their
statutes.
§30.10 Statutory

h~ckground

of employee fault

rules
Although it is frpnuently observed that
"negligence is i rrelc·!.lJ,t" in compensation law,
this statement is apt to l.>c misleading because
it is too narrow.
The correct statement is that
employee fault of any ch.-lrctcter is irrelevant,
with a few exception,; to be noted presently.
Misconduct of ttl(' c;;·r>loy,·P, whether negligent or
wilful, is immat<·ri,d not because i t is affirmatively stated to Lc so in th(' statutes (although
a few contain surh lanq'"'"''), but because the
basic test of cove1 CJ<;e is relation of the injury
to the eMploy~··"~, v:i th n" r0fcrcnce to the personal merits of th,,• l·-<rti<'"·
The Compensation
Act m<~rks out a c-1 rclP lvho,;p boundaries are fixed
by the narisin'· nu~ of" ,t!11..l •• in thl' course> of"
Pmploy::>ent cone·· •
1-.'i.:!l.Jl that circle there is
compensation.
CJ•.:: :i:!c· t); I<' is not.
~~o~t acts
arC' si::>ply si l :1: ,,. t 11r·
nt i r·e question of
g<'nPr,ll fault
,.,.,..
There is Lhf'refor<' no occ.h" '"'
:, ,
'''"'l -:h bet~o.·t·<'n nl"Jl i g<'nt f.:~ul t ,,,,: ·_.
, :. i Ill'<' f o111l L
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itself can have no bearing on the process of
drawing the boundaries of compensability.
The effect of a given act of misconduct
by an employee must be judged against a background of three different kinds of statutes:
(1) the commonest kind of statute, in which
there are no affirmative defenses based on
misconduct (except perhaps self-injury (Utab)
and intoxication); (2) statutes making wilful
misconduct a defense; and (3) statutes makin9
particular kinds of misconduct, such as wilful
failure to use safety devices or violation of
law, either a complete defense or a ground for
reduction of the amount of the award. ~us,
the act of deliberately removing safety goggles
in violation of regulations may give rise to the
contention that this takes the employee out of
the course of employment in the absence of any
affirmative defense in the statute, or the contention that this act is a clear example of the
specific defense of wilful failure to use a
safety device.
And Larsen goes on to say in section 36.60 that tbe defense
of intentional self injury, not apart from suicide, has produced
no law of significance.
only cases . . . etc.

(R-52).

That section continues:

The

(R-52).

Surely plaintiff'f> attempt to place employee's neglgent act
of hitting a door in anger as the same as a purposeful self inflicted injury is another of these"fictions" which has had no
acceptance and is out of place in the construction of compensation
acts.
POINT II.
EMPLOYEE'S ACCIDENT AND INJURY AROSE OUT
OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
"\vork connection" is the basic concept of compensation coverLarson's

a,!C.
Sf,th·s

·:,L."

usc the
liLllt

if:

l.:t'-j ~-1-l_orkru~n'
pi~:,,--,

s Compensation, section 6. 20. Forty-two

"7\ri•:ing out of and in the course of employ-

th•· •ntly

siCJLc

according to Larson which uses the
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cr1

the more broad language of "Arising out of or in the course of
employment.•

Spackman was injured in an accident in the course
an argument arising out of a work

of his employment.

Plaintiff cites Sullivan v. Ind. Com., 79 Ut.
and Calif. Casualty Indem. Exch. v. Ind. Ace. Comm.
461, 132 P.2d BlS.

Neither case is rclevent.

schedu~.

317, 10 P.2 91:
21 Cal. 2d

The Utah case

involve• an employee who was injured while returning his daughter '
to her school apartment.

The California case cites a ruling that

has no application to Utah law or cases.
Ted Spackman was injured on company property (McKay Dee
Hospital) a few feet from the office of his supervisor, after a
dispute on the employee 1 s work schedule.

And the

l~orkmen

1

f",

Com-

pensation Act should be libc' illy applied in favor of cover aye.
Askrt~n

v. Ind.

Com~,

15 U.2 275,

391 P.2 302.

Cases cited by Plaint iff hospital as supporting

po~;:i

tion

that thcrP was no ".tcc-id, nl"

'n fact supports position there was

an accident.

continually held "that for the'

Thi·

court

purpose of the Act,
Carling v.

it

Industri~l

11 '"

(an·i dent)

should be given a bro<Hi meaning.

Con~mi''sio~,

16 U. 2d 260, and Graybar _r~

POl :·JT I I I .
Till·: PERIO!l 01' TE:!P0'\!1~1 TC)TAL DISABILITY
I-lAO, l'i:SlJI.'i' 01 ;,cCillENT OF APHIL 5, 197fl.

Plaintiff'!; H1 tcf, 1'·'·.1•
additionill init11·y

t

'hi,

1 in

lO,

;··r·

states thilt employe(· cauc;<'cl

1,·:'""

he hit thC' cilst on the ceil-

1·

l:t

t

l1

aft(' r

t lt<'

(,

r 1 ~J

i
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11.11

accident.

On that date the doctor related that he va•

about infection" and prescribed an antibiotic.

•CCncaZr••

'l'he doctor Oil

that date also noted "there seems to be possibly sa.e ly•la of
the bone."

(R-2

&

3).

It therefore appears that osteomyelitis had already
as of May 5, when the cast was replaced because of the
of hitting cast on the ceiling of his room.

'l'his

•tazte~

iDoideD~

inciden~

llkel7

allowed the treating of the infection faster and more successful
than if the incident of May 5th had not occurred.
The doctor also "very strongly admonished him to avo14 all
trauma to the hand."
The record contains no information that would substantiate
a shorter period of temporary total disability.

SUMMARY
The Order of the Industrial Commission granting an awar4
will not be disturbed if there is any substantial competent
evidence to support it.

The Record complelely supports the

Order.
Dated this ~day of March, 1979.

~~-:::2~
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
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